In this paper, we estimate the benefits to countries that purchase goods from China by having access to intermediary services provided in Hong Kong. Traders in Hong Kong supply information on markets and producers in China, which provides welfare gains to foreign firms using these services. During the 1990s, Hong Kong intermediated about one-half of the goods that China exported to the rest of the world. Using constant elasticity demand curves, we find that the gains to intermediary services provided by Hong Kong are roughly equal to the value of these Hong Kong re-exports, and four to five times larger than the markups earned in Hong Kong. Using a linear approximation to the demand curves instead, we find that the gains are one-quarter as much as the value of re-exports, or slightly larger than the markups.
Introduction
Among the fastest growing countries of the world, China's entry into global markets during the past two decades has already brought large changes to the pattern of world trade. These changes will no doubt be accelerated by its entry into the World Trade Organization. But China's large and growing trade volumes have not been achieved through liberalization and growth alone. To a substantial extent, its trade has been intermediated by the entrepôt economy of Hong Kong. Over the time period 1988 to 1998, an average of 53% of Chinese exports were re-exported through Hong Kong.
1 Recent theoretical literature emphasizes the importance of intermediaries in reducing informational barriers to international trade (Casella and Rauch, 2002 , Rauch and Casella, 2003 , Rauch and Trindade, 2003 , Rauch and Watson, 2004 , Wan and Weisman, 1999 . This is confirmed by empirical studies, such as Gould (1994) , Head and Ries (1998) , and Rauch and Trindade (2002) , who find that bilateral trade volumes are higher between countries that share large immigration flows and/or ethnic populations. Presumably, these networks serve as conduits of information about trading opportunities.
Hong Kong traders engage in a range of activities that benefit their clients. Large trading houses such as Li and Fung identify firms on the mainland that can engage in "outward processing," whereby inputs are imported into China dutyfree and processed there, with the final outputs re-exported through Hong Kong (Sung, 1991) . 2 The markups on Hong Kong re-exports of Chinese goods averaged 23% over 1988 -98. For Hong Kong overall, Young (1999 and Enright et al (1997) estimate that trading services accounted for about 20% of Hong Kong GDP in 1994, whereas manufacturing accounted for only 7% of GDP in that year. The large value of these trading services suggest that substantial gains accrue to the mainland provinces engaged in processing, as well as the partner countries overseas. Re-exporting means that the goods did not receive "substantial transformation" en-route, but did benefit from sorting, packaging, or the application of service activities such as marketing or transport. Goods that are simply shipped through Hong Kong, without being removed from their carriers, are not counted among re-exports. 2 In addition, firms in Hong Kong broker inflows of foreign direct investment and international loans to China, and advise foreign firms doing business in China (Sung, 1991) . Naughton (1999a) suggests Hong Kong firms engage in "property rights arbitrage": they use their specific knowledge of business conditions in China and the security of property rights in Hong Kong to broker deals with agents who want access to China's market but are wary about its insecure property rights. 3 For mainland China, Lin (2003) estimates the impact of processing trade on provincial wages, using the methodology of Redding and Venables (2004) . She finds that about one-quarter of the wage disparity between coastal provinces can be explained by their access to international markets.
Our goal in this paper is to estimate the benefits to countries that purchase goods from China by having access to intermediary services provided by Hong Kong. As a starting point, in section 2 we discuss the extent to which the markups themselves -or some simple multiple of these -can bound the welfare gains to purchasers. The answer to this is sensitive to the functional form of the demand curve for Hong Kong traders, and we discuss two cases: constant elasticity and linear demand. However, we argue that a distinction also needs to be made between the demand curve facing individual traders providing differentiated services, versus the aggregate demand curve facing all Hong Kong traders; this is analogous to the distinction between the "dd" and "DD" curves in monopolistic competition. The demand curve "dd" facing individual traders determines their markups (in the absence of collusion), whereas the demand curve "DD" for all such traders reflects the benefits from having them available (versus the alternative of contracting with China directly). So the welfare gains from having intermediaries in Hong Kong should be derived from the latter demand curve. 4 The goal of our empirical work, then, is to carefully distinguish the demand curves for individual traders versus their aggregate. We do this in a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) framework. In addition to its tractability, we argue that this framework is consistent with an underlying decision problem where firms in purchasing countries are making a discrete choice over whether to use a Hong Kong trader versus contract with China directly, and then which trader or Chinese supplier to use. Thinking of the decision problem as a discrete choice over organizational forms -whether to outsource to China directly or through intermediaries in Hong Kong -is consistent with recent theoretical work on trade and organizations, such as Helpman (2002a,b, 2004) , Verdier (2002, 2003) , Puga and Trefler (2002) , Antràs (2003) and Feenstra and Hanson (2004a) . 5 In section 3 we describe this discrete choice model and resulting CES framework, while the estimating equations are derived in section 4. While we have some information on prices charged by traders in Hong Kong (used to obtain their markups), these prices are of limited usefulness in estimating demand because they do not reflect the transportation charges to the destination countries. So we introduce the distances to each destination country as variables that determine c.i.f. (cost, insurance, freight) prices, and in a first-stage estimation use 4 The distinction between the demand for individual varieties of a differentiated product (dd) versus their aggregate (DD) is also made by Bresnahan and Gordon (1997) in their discussion of the gains from new products. 5 Empirical literature on transactions costs also uses a discrete-choice framework to examine make-or-buy decisions. See Baker and Hubbard (2001) and Whinston (2003) for discussion and references. these to estimate the aggregate "price" of using Hong Kong traders versus contract with China directly. In a second stage, these estimated prices are used to explain the demand for processing goods re-exported through Hong Kong versus exported from China directly. This second-stage estimation in section 5 provides us with the elasticities of the aggregate demand curve facing Hong Kong traders. In section 6 we use these elasticities to impute the welfare gains from foreign firms being able to purchase Chinese goods through Hong Kong. On average, these gains are roughly equal to the value of Hong Kong re-exports of Chinese processed goods, and four to five times larger than the markups earned. Using a linear approximation to the demand curves instead, we find that the gains are onequarter as much as the value of re-exports, or slightly larger than the markups. Additional conclusions are provided in section 7.
Using Hong Kong Markups
We examine the decision of a firm from country m to use China as a partner to acquire a good. The decision tree for a firm in country m is shown in Figure 1 . Firms can either have a good processed in China or have it processed elsewhere. This decision occurs at the first level, where h = 1 refers to sending goods to China for further processing, and h = 2 refers to sending them elsewhere to be processed. This first choice is implicit in our analysis and not one we examine empirically. At the next level, the firm must decide whether to use intermediaries in Hong Kong (i=1), or contract with China directly (i=2). At the final level, the firm (or its intermediary in Hong Kong) must decide with which province im J j∈ in China to contract. The set of available provinces J im depends on whether or not Hong Kong is used as an intermediary and on the destination country m. As illustrated in Figure 1 , this problem involves three levels of nesting, but we focus only on the second and third levels.
Consider the lowest level of nesting, when a firm is deciding which province j to use for its outsourcing activity in China. We denote by x ijm the processing activity in China by a firm from country m, where i=1 means that it is arranged by a trader in Hong Kong, and i=2 means that it is arranged directly with China. Suppose this activity costs p ij for any firm m. Then aggregating over purchasing firms, in Figure 2 we show a demand curve "dd j " for the processing activity in province j when it is arranged through Hong Kong, i.e. x 1j depending on p 1j . The elasticity of this demand curve at the lowest level of nesting depends on competition from other provinces j in China that can provide the outsourcing services. That is, we can think of each province as providing a differentiated product in its outsourcing services, and the elasticity of the demand curve in Figure 2 reflects that differentiation across provincial services.
…..… Figure 1: Decision Tree for Firm Outsourcing
Our assumption that outsourcing services are differentiated across provinces reflects in part the data we have available, where provinces (rather than the firm) are the lowest level of aggregation. However, it also reflects the economy of China, which has restrictions across provinces in labor mobility, technological capability, and even the shipment of goods. Young (2000) has argued on the basis of data on provincial production structure that economic integration among Chinese provinces is limited and declining -that China has become, "a fragmented internal market with fiefdoms controlled by local officials." On the other hand, Naughton (1999b) has argued that data on inter-
Process in China h=1
Process elsewhere h=2
Hong Kong i=1
China Direct i=2
Province j=1
Province j=30 Firm in Country m provincial flows of goods, taken from the input-output tables, suggests that interprovincial trade is relatively high and increasing. This debate, combined with differences in labor skills across provinces, provides some justification for treating outsourcing services as differentiated across them.
Suppose that province j in China charges c 1j per unit of the processing activity x 1j when it is arranged through Hong Kong. The Hong Kong traders arrange matches of foreign firms with factories in China, and they extract some surplus depending on the elasticity of the demand curve dd j . If the demand curve has elasticity of σ 1 >1, then we can suppose that the Hong Kong traders charge the standard markup, p 1j = c 1j [σ 1 /(σ 1 -1)]. Furthermore, with a constant elasticity σ 1 >1, it is easy to confirm by integration that the consumer surplus "cs j " above the price p ij on the demand curve equals cs j = π 1j [σ 1 /(σ 1 -1)], where π 1j are the profits or markups earned by the Hong Kong traders. Thus, the consumer surplus from outsourcing through Hong Kong is a simple multiple of the markups earned, depending on the elasticity σ 1 . Alternatively, since the revenue of the Hong Kong traders is related to profits by p 1j x 1j = π 1j σ 1 , then consumer surplus can be expressed as cs j = p 1j x 1j /(σ 1 -1). Figure 2 We can contrast these formulas with those obtained using a linear demand curve, denoted by p 1j = a -bx 1j . If the Hong Kong trader again faces costs of c 1j , then it is readily confirmed that p 1j = (a+c 1j )/2, π 1j = (a -c 1j )x 1j /2, and cs j = (ac 1j )x 1j /4, so that cs j = π 1j /2. In contrast to the constant elasticity case, consumer surplus is now one-half as much as the markups earned. Some additional calculations show that if the linear demand curve is tangent to the constant elasticity curve dd j at the observed price and quantity, so the elasticity of the linear curve at this point equals σ 1 , then we can express consumer surplus as cs j = p 1j x 1j /2σ 1 .
6 This is less than one-half the measure of consumer surplus for the constant-elasticity demand curve.
However, there is a conceptual difficulty with using these calculations for the welfare gains due to Hong Kong traders. If the option of using these traders is not available, then foreign firms would need to contract directly with China. The choice between using Hong Kong traders versus China directly occurs at the next higher level of nesting in Figure 1 . The overall demand curve for Hong Kong traders is illustrated by DD in Figure 3 , which is a demand curve between an aggregate P 1 of the provincial prices p 1j , and an aggregate X 1 of the processing quantities x 1j . Denoting the elasticity of this curve by σ 0 , it reflects the tradeoff between using a Hong Kong trader versus contracting directly with China, and we can presume that 1 < σ 0 < σ 1 . In the constant elasticity case, consumer surplus from having Hong Kong traders available is CS = P 1 X 1 /(σ 0 -1), where P 1 X 1
. With σ 0 < σ 1 we clearly have CS ∑ = > J 1 j j cs , so we obtain a higher level of consumer surplus on the aggregate demand curve. Alternatively, if the aggregate demand curve is linear and tangent to DD at the price P 1 and quantity X 1 , then consumer surplus would be CS = P 1 X 1 /2σ 0 . With σ 0 < σ 1 we again obtain a higher level of consumer surplus on the aggregate demand curve than the disaggregate linear curves. We believe that consumer surplus (CS) is the appropriate measure of welfare gains from having Hong Kong traders available, and its measurement depends on the elasticity σ 0 , which reflects substitution between using Hong Kong traders and contracting with China directly. We will model this in the next section using a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) model, which we derive from the underlying discrete choice framework outlined in Figure 1 . When we come to measure the welfare gains, we will do so for both the CES case and for the linear demand curves that approximate the CES demand curves.
CES Model
Suppose that firms in country m commit to spend the amount C m to produce an input, including material purchases and any additional labor needed. We will suppose that these costs are given by a Cobb-Douglas function of the prices p ijm paid in Chinese province j, and the prices of other inputs q im paid in the home country:
where y m is the production of the finished good. For example, q im can reflect the cost of the raw materials or wages in the home country, while p ijm reflects the cost of performing the processing activity in Chinese province im J j∈ . These depend on whether the firm uses Hong Kong as an intermediary (i=1) or buys directly from China (i=2). Also, these costs can depend on the foreign country m, as would be the case with different shipping costs from China/Hong Kong to the destination country m.
Let us normalize the price of home labor or materials at unity, q im ≡ 1. Then solving for production y m from (1), we obtain:
In the absence of other considerations, the firm would choose the mode of outsourcing and province with the minimum price p ijm , which would result in maximum output y m . However, let us now suppose that the actual output y ijm differs from that in (2) by a random error:
where ε ijm reflects transaction costs arising from outsourcing to a Chinese or Hong Kong partner. The term ε ijm in (3) is a random component of production that is observable ex ante to firms. That is, each firm in country m receives a different draw from the distribution for ε ijm , and makes its optimizing decisions based on this draw. In (3), there are two potential advantages to purchasing goods through Hong Kong rather than from China directly. First, the quality of production for inputs purchased through Hong Kong may be higher, implying a lower effective cost of production, p 1jm . This might occur if Hong Kong traders have better information about the quality of producers in China than do foreign firms. Second, transaction costs could differ for purchases through Hong Kong. If foreign firms have limited experience in dealing directly with Chinese suppliers or with importing and exporting goods in the country, they might perceive these transaction costs as high relative to those from purchasing through Hong Kong, so that the (positive) production shock ε 1jm for Hong Kong in (3) is higher than ε 2jm for China.
The firm will choose the mode of outsourcing i=1,2 and supplier province j∈J im to maximize its production given costs of C m . The solution to this problem depends on the values of transactions costs in each case, i.e. the ex post values of ε ijm . We will assume that these random errors are distributed as extreme value across all firms in each country m, but allow for correlation in the transactions costs in each case. In particular, suppose that the correlation across provinces in the transactions costs associated with using a Hong Kong intermediary is ρ 1 ; the correlation across provinces in the transactions costs associated with contracting with China directly is ρ 2 ; and the correlation between using a Hong Kong intermediary and dealing with China directly is ρ 0 . An implication of the discrete choice literature is that the correlation should satisfy 0 < ρ 0 < ρ i < 1, meaning that the errors are more highly correlated across provinces within a mode of outsourcing than across outsourcing modes (McFadden, 1978, p. 84) . That is, the uncertainty in transaction costs that a U.S. firm faces when securing a supplier in Yunan versus Shangxi province is more highly correlated than that between the U.S. firm and a Hong Kong intermediary when securing a supplier in the same province.
With this error structure, let Y m ≡ exp[E(ln y ijm )] denote the expected value of production for a firm in country m that has spent C m on outsourcing. That is, we are aggregating across the draws of ε ijm received by each firm, allowing them to choose their optimal pattern of outsourcing. Then as discussed in the Appendix, it can be shown that the costs C m are related to expected output by the CES function,
It is useful to relate this CES system back to the demand curves introduced in Figures 2 and 3. The provincial demand curve dd j in Figure 2 reflects the demand for Chinese outsourcing by intermediaries in Hong Kong. These provincial-level exports can be derived formally by applying Shepard's Lemma to equation (4):
, (5) where the term
value" in the discrete choice literature. Notice that this term is closely related to the CES price index for Hong Kong re-exports (i=1) or direct Chinese exports (i=2), which we define as:
To simplify the demand function in (5), consider taking the ratio of exports from two supplying provinces
, to obtain the relative demand 7 A principal result of Anderson, de Palma and Thisse (1989, 1992) is that the CES indirect utility function is obtained from a discrete choice model using Cobb-Douglas utility with extreme value errors, as in our framework. This is also discussed in Feenstra (2004, Appendix B) . It is noteworthy that in Anderson, de Palma and Thisse (1989, 1992) , the variance of the extreme value distribution is used to obtain alternative elasticities of substitution across products: when the variance of the additive error is small, the substitution between products due to price differences is large. We have instead relied on correlations in the additive error across products to motive the elasticity of substitution. from country m:
Thus, the elasticity of substitution between two provincial suppliers, using either Hong Kong as an intermediary (i=1) or purchasing directly from China (i=2), is
Considering the next higher level of nesting, we can also use (5) to compute the ratio of country m expenditure on all products from Hong Kong versus all products imported directly from China. Define the total value of exports to country m in each mode as,
Deflating these by the CES price indexes in (6), we obtain real exports X im ≡ E im /P im . Then from (5) we have that Hong Kong relative to China exports to country m are:
The left-side of (9) is ratio of real exports from Hong Kong versus China directly. We see that this depends on the ratio of price indexes for the two modes of outsourcing, and the elasticity of substitution equals σ 0 = 1+[α/(1-ρ 0 )] > 1. With 0 < ρ 0 < ρ i < 1, these higher-level elasticities are less than or equal to the lower-level elasticities of substitution,
This illustrates the idea that the elasticity of the aggregate demand curve DD in Figure  3 , for Hong Kong intermediaries, should be less than that of the provincial demand curve dd j in Figure 3 .
The ultimate goal of our empirical work is to measure the upper-level elasticity of substitution in (9) -the substitution between using a Hong Kong trader versus contracting with China directly -and use this to infer the welfare gains of having Hong Kong traders available. Given this, do we even need to bother estimating the lower-level elasticity across provincial suppliers? The answer is yes, because the CES price indexes P im that appear in (6) and (9), or alternatively, the inclusive values I im , are not directly observed. We will in fact be estimating the price indexes/inclusive values in a first stage of estimation, relying on the provincial level data. In a second stage, we will use the estimated price indexes to infer the upper-level elasticity of substitution and welfare gains.
Before describing this two-stage method in detail, we should comment on how our CES system compares with other functional forms that might be used. In particular, there is concern in the discrete choice literature that using iid extreme value errors, as in the logit specification, results in welfare gains due to new products that are too large. Petrin (2002) , for example, estimates the welfare gains due to the introduction of minivans, and contrasts the logit specification to an alternative specification that allows for random parameters in the utility function itself, that are correlated with demographic characteristics of buyers. This alternative specification allows households with children, for example, to have different preferences between minivans and sedans from other households. He finds that the welfare gains due to the introduction of minivans are much lower in this alternative specification. In view of this, might we be overstating the welfare gains by using our CES formulation?
To partially answer this, notice that the logit specification used by Petrin (2002) has the conventional iid extreme value errors, and the same degree of overstatement of welfare gains might not be expected from a nested logit, whereby consumers first choose between sedans and minivans, and then choose which model to purchase. In that case, the researcher can readily introduce a high degree of correlation of the random error in utility for all minivans, so an individual who liked one model would also like others, but an individual who disliked one would also dislike others. If the two groups i=1,2 represent sedans and minivans, then ρ i would be the correlation across errors within each group. Furthermore, in our framework we also allow for a correlation in errors ρ 0 across groups, reflecting the idea that a firm choosing between using a Hong Kong trader versus contracting with China directly can have correlated transactions costs in these alternatives. If this correlation is large, then the substitution across groups is also large, and the welfare gains from having an entire group available are correspondingly small. Because we allow for this parameter, we may not be as subject to the criticism of having welfare gains that are "too large."
Another way to express the concern with using extreme value errors is that their domain is unbounded, which implies in the CES framework that there is always some buyer at any price (i.e. the reservation prices are infinite). Hausman (1997) , for example, has argued that the consumer surplus obtained for such demand curves is too large. Hausman (1999) recommends using a linear approximation to the demand curve, which is tangent to it at the observed price and quantity. For any convex demand curve, this will clearly lead to a lower-bound for the welfare gain. We will follow this recommendation after estimating the CES system, and alternatively calculate the welfare gains due to Hong Kong traders using the linear approximation.
Estimating Equations
Equations (5) and (9) will form the basis of our empirical work. To simplify these, we multiply the quantity of exports in (5) by prices to obtain the value E ijm = p ijm x ijm , which is exports from province j to country m using the mode of outsourcing i=1,2. The total value of exports to country m under each mode is as in (8). Then the value of provincial and total exports is computed from (5) as:
and,
A difficulty we face is that we do not observe the prices p ijm appearing in (10), which should be measured on a c.i.f. (cost, insurance, freight) basis to the destination countries m. 9 To overcome this, we will model the c.i.f. prices p ijm from province j in China to destination country m as a simple function of distance:
where d ijm is the distance from province j to country m, and p ij is the f.o.b. (free on board) price in province j net of any transport costs. Substituting these prices into (10) and (11), we can write exports as:
and, 
9
The prices that we use to measure markups in Hong Kong are the unit-value of goods when they enter Hong Kong from China and when they leave. The latter do not include freight charges. Equation (13) gives exports from province j to country m relative to total Chinese exports to country m, either via Hong Kong (i=1) or directly (i=2). These relative exports depend on the f.o.b. price in province j, ln p ij , which we also do not observe.
10 But with observations on provincial exports to many purchasing countries, we can estimate this first variable on the right of (13) as the coefficient on indicator variable for province j,
, depending on the mode of outsourcing. The second variable on the right of (13) is the inclusive value for exports of mode i to country m. Again, with data on exports to purchasing countries from many provinces we can estimate this as the coefficient on an indicator variable for purchasing country m, im im I ln − ≡ δ , depending on the mode of outsourcing. Then we re-write (13) to obtain our first regression equation:
where
. The error term in (15) 
where the signs of the coefficients on the right have changed from (14) due to the substitution
,2, and we also include a constant term α 0 . Summing up, in the first stage of estimation we shall estimate (15) while pooling over Chinese provinces j=1,…,J im and destination countries m=1,…,M. Separate regressions are estimated depending on whether the Chinese exports go through Hong Kong or not (i=1,2), and also for each year of data. The estimates of the inclusive values
,2, are obtained as the coefficients of 10 As explained in the previous note, we observe the unit-values of goods when they enter Hong Kong from China and when they leave. The difficulty with using either of these to measure p ij is that the unit-values do not correct for quality. Thus, observing a price of 100 yuan/lb. of steel from one Chinese province and 200 yuan/lb. from another does not mean that the second province has a higher price, because the steel might be higher quality. This problem arises even at highly disaggregate levels for goods, as we use to construct the markups.
indicator variables for each source-province and destination-country in (15), leaving distance as the remaining independent variable. These inclusive values reflect the aggregate price index for sales to each destination country m, including the effect of distance. To emphasize this, notice that the estimate of the destination-country fixed effect in (15) will ensure that the errors ijm µ sum to zero, so that:
With a negative coefficient on distance, 0 i < γ , we see that the inclusive value im δ will increase as the distance to the destination country grows. Distance is therefore playing a critical role in identifying these inclusive values. In the second stage, the inclusive values are used in (16) to estimate the relative expenditure on exports from Hong Kong versus directly from China, using the data m=1,…,M over destination countries. 11 We will also pool data over multiple years to estimate (16), on the assumption that the parameters ρ i and ρ 0 are constant over time.
We can usefully compare (15) with two alternative methodologies from different fields. First, in the so-called "gravity equation" of international trade, exports are regressed on country GDPs and the distance between them. Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003) have correctly criticized this conventional approach since it fails to take account of the price indexes that should appear in the equation. They show how to implicitly solve for the price index using observed trade data, and build this into their estimation. The inclusive values that we have used are very similar to their price indexes: the price indexes in (6) are
, so the indicator variables δ im are directly proportional to the prices indexes. By including the indicator variables δ im in equations (15) and (16), we are effectively including the price indexes, consistent with the critique of Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) .
Second, in the discrete choice literature, Berry (1994) shows how marketlevel demand equations can be used to identify the parameters of the discrete choice model, in cases where individual data is not available. Similar to this, we are using aggregate trade data (i.e. by province, destination country, and mode of outsourcing) in (15) and (16) to infer the benefits of the discrete choices made by firms.
Indeed, in the market-level equation corresponding to the logit specification, Berry (1994) uses the log of market share as the dependent variable, which is analogous to (15) and (16). As regressors he includes are the prices of differentiated products, and their characteristics. In our case, since the c.i.f. prices of exports by province are not observed, we have modeled them as depending on the distance to each destination country. We can think of these distances as being a characteristic of each province/destination country pair, and then the f.o.b. prices as well as the inclusive values/price indexes become fixed effects in our first stage estimation.
Data and Estimation
Data on direct trade between Chinese provinces and destination countries is obtained from the Customs General Administration of the People's Republic of China, which provides the value and quantity of exports and imports under the ordinary and processing trade regime by province and year for 1988 to 1998. To compile indirect exports of Chinese goods that are sent to Hong Kong and then reexported, we use Hong Kong imports, exports, and re-exports from the Hong Kong Census and Statistical Office for 1988 to 1998. By comparing the unitvalue of disaggregate goods as they enter Hong Kong from China with their unitvalue as they are re-exported, the markups charged in Hong Kong are also computed.
12
We measure distance between Chinese provinces and the rest of the world in two different ways: arc distance, which is the minimum-length arc that connects each Chinese province to a destination country, and "internal-external" distances, which assumes that goods from an interior province must pass through a transportation hub in a coastal province (internal distance), and then be delivered to the rest of the world (external distance). Internal distance is in terms of rail distance, obtained from Chinese railroad timetables. External distance is the arc distance between a Chinese port and the destination country.
13 Table 1 shows total China exports, China outward processing exports, and Hong Kong re-exports of Chinese goods for 1988-1998. Total China exports (direct trade plus re-exports) have risen dramatically over time. Outward processing and shipments through Hong Kong are a substantial part of this total. The outward processing share of China's total exports in column (5) increases from 32% in 1988 to 55% by 1998. The re-export share of China's total exports in column (2) increases from 43% in 1988 to 61% in 1993 and then declines to 45% by 1998. The decline in the later period may be due in part to increases in exports by Chinese regions distant from Hong Kong (Sung, 1997) . The re-export share of Chinese outward processing exports shown in column (3) also rises and 12 This calculation is described in Feenstra et al (1998 Feenstra et al ( , 1999 . In this paper we update those calculations, and report average markups over all destination countries. 13 We obtain each location's latitude and longitude from http://www.mapblast.com/myblast/ index.mb , and http://www.nau.edu/~cvm/latlongdist.html provides the distance calculation. then falls, from 67% in 1988 to 83% in 1993 and then down to 61% by 1998. Columns (4)- (5) show that the outward processing share of direct Chinese exports is smaller than for Hong Kong re-exports, though both have been rising over time. Notes: Column (1) shows total China exports (direct exports plus re-exports through Hong Kong) in billions of current U.S. dollars; column (2) shows Chinese reexports through Hong Kong as a share of total Chinese exports; column (3) shows Chinese re-exports through Hong Kong of outward processing goods as a share of total Chinese outward processing exports; columns (4)-(6) shows the share of exports related to outward processing in direct Chinese exports to countries other than Hong Kong, Chinese re-exports to Hong Kong, and total Chinese exports. Table 2 shows the distribution of total Chinese exports and Hong Kong reexports of Chinese goods across one-digit SITC (Standard Industrial Trade Classification) industries. About 43% of total exports are in miscellaneous manufactured articles (SITC 8), whose major sub-sectors are apparel, footwear and toys. Machinery and transport equipment (SITC 7) and manufactured goods classified by material (SITC 6), which include leather, metal, paper, rubber, textile and wood products, are two additional important sources of exports, each accounting for 17% of shipments. SITC 7 and 8 are the two industries in which re-exports account for the largest fraction of total exports, with re-export shares of 70%. These are also the two industries in which outward-processed goods dominate China's shipments to Hong Kong. Notes: Column (1) shows each one-digit SITC industry's share of total Chinese exports; column (2) shows the share of re-exports in each industry's total exports; column (3) shows re-exports through Hong Kong of outward processing goods as a share of industry outward processing exports; and columns (4)-(5) show the share of exports related to outward processing in direct industry exports to countries other than Hong Kong, and industry re-exports to Hong Kong. All figures are averages over the 1988-1998 period. Table 3 shows the distribution of direct exports and Hong Kong re-exports across regions and the average share of re-exports in total exports by region. For both direct exports and re-exports, the major destinations are the relatively large markets of North America, Western Europe, and East Asia. The regions for which re-exports account for most trade include the relatively rich and distant regions of North America (71%) and Western Europe (62%), the relatively rich and near region of Oceania (61%), and the relatively poor and distant regions of Latin America (65%) and Africa (50%). Evidently, the benefits of using Hong Kong as an intermediary are less important for other nearby countries in Asia, and Eastern Europe. (2). Column (3) shows the share of re-exports in Chinese exports to each region. All figures are averages over the period 1988-1998.
First Stage Estimation
In the first stage regression we estimate equation (15), using both measures of distance. Table 4 reports OLS coefficient estimates for 1995, and (15). The dependent variable is the log ratio of outward processing exports by Chinese province, industry, and destination country to total outward processing exports by industry and destination country (regressions are run separately for each year in the sample). The independent variables are log distance, indicator variables for the destination country, and indicator variables for the Chinese province. The regressions are run separately for two outsourcing modes, direct exports from China and re-exports of Chinese goods through Hong Kong. T-statistics are in parentheses.
estimates for other years are very similar. The dependent variable is direct Chinese exports or indirect Hong Kong re-exports from Chinese provinces to destination countries. All exports are of goods related to outward processing. The independent variables are the log of arc distance or the log of internal distance plus the log of external distance, as well as indicator variables for destination countries and Chinese provinces. For direct exports from China, the coefficients on arc distance and internal-external distances are negative and precisely estimated. For Hong Kong re-exports, the coefficients on internal-external distances are negative and precisely estimated, but the coefficient on arc distance has a positive sign. We constructed arc distance for Hong Kong reexports as the sum of the arc distance between the Chinese province and Hong Kong and the arc distance between Hong Kong and rest of the world. We suspect that the arc distance between the Chinese province and Hong Kong may be a poor indicator of true transportation cost because of uneven rail, road, and water links within the country. The internal (i.e. rail) distance is likely to be a better measure of this type of transportation cost.
To see whether the coefficient estimates vary across industries, Table 5 presents the first stage regression results in 1995 for one-digit SITC industries. We first show results for direct Chinese trade and then for Hong Kong re-exports. In both cases, the distance measures are the internal and external variables. There are more observations for Hong Kong re-exports than for direct China trade, which suggests that Chinese provinces are able to trade with a larger number of countries when firms use traders in Hong Kong as intermediaries. For direct China trade, in most industries internal and external distance are negatively correlated with exports. A few industries, such as beverages and tobacco, have anomalous results.
For Hong Kong re-exports, in most industries internal distance is negative and precisely estimated but external distance is estimated quite imprecisely. It appears that Hong Kong re-exports of Chinese goods are only weakly correlated with distance to the destination country. One explanation of this result is that since external distance is the arc distance from Hong Kong to the destination country, it may be a noisy measure of transportation costs. A second explanation is that internal distance, the distance from a Chinese port to the exporting province, is of primary concern to the purchasing countries. Given the large costs of transporting goods from China's interior to the coast, firms in destination countries may prefer to purchase goods from provinces that have a geographic advantage in delivering the goods to Hong Kong.
Second Stage Estimation
In the second-stage we estimate equation (16), which explains the ratio of Hong Kong re-exports to direct Chinese exports. As regressors we use the estimated coefficients on the destination-country indicator variables, , im δ i=1,2, obtained from estimation of the first-stage equation (using the internal-external distance variables). These coefficients reflect the inclusive values for direct purchases from China versus indirect purchases through Hong Kong. The dependent variable in (16) is the ratio of Hong Kong re-exports to direct China exports for a given destination country. An increase in the Hong Kong inclusive value (price index) should lower the relative Hong Kong share, while an increase in the direct China inclusive value (price index) should raise the relative Hong Kong share.
14 Therefore, the Hong Kong inclusive value (price index) should enter with a negative sign in (16), and the direct China inclusive value should enter with a positive sign. We run this regression with data pooled over 11 years, all destination countries, and all industries. Table 6 presents the estimation results for the second-stage regression. The implication of the discrete choice literature that 0 < ρ 0 < ρ i < 1 means that the estimated coefficients on inclusive values (price indexes) should both be less than unity in absolute value. The results are consistent with this restriction under either specification of distance. In addition the signs of the estimated coefficients are all as expected and are all precisely estimated. (16), using data over 1988-1998. The dependent variable is the log ratio of direct China outward processing exports to Hong-Kong re-exports of outward processed goods from China by industry and destination country (with regressions run by year). The independent variables are coefficients on the indicator variables for destination country from the regressions in columns (1) and (2) in Table 4 . Standard errors are corrected by using bootstrap techniques and t-statistics are in parentheses.
14 Recall from (13) that the elasticities of the relative expenditures with respect to each price index are greater than one in absolute value. Table 7 reports the second-stage estimation results at the one-digit SITC level. The first column of Table 7 indicates that for most industries the Hong Kong inclusive values have the expected negative sign and are precisely estimated. The exceptions are manufacturing goods classified by material, which has the wrong sign, and miscellaneous manufacturing articles, which is imprecisely estimated. When the second-stage regression for manufacturing goods classified by material is instead run using the inclusive values obtained from the first-stage using arc distance, the second-stage results are improved, and those results are reported in Table 7 (and will be used for later calculations). In the second column, the inclusive values for direct Chinese trade have the expected positive sign and are precisely estimated for six industries and are imprecisely estimated for two industries.
Welfare Benefits from China's Trade with Hong Kong
We turn now to the question posed at the outset of the paper: what is the welfare gain to a country from being able to purchase Chinese goods through Hong Kong rather than from China directly? Going through Hong Kong gives buyers access to intermediary services they might not have otherwise. We utilize the indirect production function in (8) for the representative firm in country m.
Using the indicator variables
, we can write this value as, [ ]
The benefits to a purchasing country from having Hong Kong available can be computed as the log of the ratio of expected production with and without this intermediary, or,
where the equality is obtained by making use of Hong Kong re-exports and China exports, E 1m and E 2m , as in (11). This welfare expression can be re-written as,
where the final inequality follows from the concavity of the natural log function.
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We have derived (18) as the percentage change in expected production Y m from having the Hong Kong intermediaries available. To express this instead as a percentage of total imports (E 1m + E 2m ) we should divide by α, which is the share of imports from China or Hong Kong in total costs. Alternatively, to express it as a percentage of re-exports from Hong Kong , E 1m , then we should divide by αE 1m /(E 1m + E 2m ). Then the lower bound to the welfare gain for each purchasing county m is:
CES welfare gain relative to Hong Kong re-exports = ) 1 (
where σ 0 = 1+[α/(1-ρ 0 )] is the upper-level elasticity of substitution, corresponding to the demand curve DD in Figure 3 . Notice that we obtained the same formula for consumer surplus in section 2, CS m /P 1m X 1m = 1/(σ 0 -1).
16
Alternatively, using a linear approximation to the demand curve DD, which is tangent to it at the price P 1 and quantity X 1 , the welfare gain computed in section 2 was:
Linear welfare gain relative to Hong Kong imports = 0 2 1 σ .
To compute these welfare gains, we need to have an estimate of the upperlevel elasticity of substitution σ 0 = 1+[α/(1-ρ 0 )]. Our coefficients of our secondstage estimation (16) provide us with estimates of the ratios (1-ρ i )/(1-ρ 0 ), which equal (σ 0 -1)/(σ i -1), where σ i = 1+[α/(1-ρ i )] are the lower-level elasticities of substitution (corresponding to the demand curves dd j in Figure 2 ). That is, the coefficients of the inclusive values in the second-stage regressions provide us with the ratios of the upper-level and lower-level elasticities.
17 To obtain the 15 We prefer using the lower bound on the right of (18) to the expression on the left, because it can be argued that the lower bound is robust to having alternative countries for outsourcing beyond just Hong Kong and China. That is, the lower bound on the right of (18) would apply even if we included the upper-level decision in Figure 1 , over whether to purchase from China (directly or via Hong Kong) or from another country. 16 In section 2 we did not yet distinguish the purchasing countries m. Also, in section 2 we treated σ 0 as the elasticity of demand rather than the elasticity of substitution of the DD curve. In general, the elasticity of demand for the aggregate X 1m , as can be computed from (15), is less than the elasticity of substitution σ 0 in absolute value. By computing consumer surplus using the elasticity σ 0 we are deriving a lower bound to the welfare gain. 17 The reason that we do not directly obtain the upper-level elasticities from the second-stage regression is because the indicator variables used as regressors estimate the inclusive values rather than the price indexes. These are proportional in logs, but differ by the term α(1 -ρ i ) = (σ i -1).
upper-level elasticities, we proceed by using the Hong Kong markups to give us an estimate of the lower-level elasticity, and then inflate these using the coefficient on the Hong Kong inclusive values in the second-stage regression. The details of this calculation are provided in Tables 8 and 9 . Notes: Column (1) is computed from Hong Kong trade data, as in Feenstra et al (1998 Feenstra et al ( , 1999 . Column (2) equals (1/markup). Column (3) equals [(σ 1 -1)0.28]+1, where 0.28 is the absolute coefficient of the Hong Kong indicator variable for processing trade in Table 6 . Column (4) equals 1/(σ 0 -1), and column (5) equals column (4) times column (1). Column (6) equals 1/2σ 0 , and column (7) equals column (6) times column (1). Notes: Column (1) is computed from Hong Kong trade data, as in Feenstra et al (1998 Feenstra et al ( , 1999 . Column (2) equals (1/markup). Column (3) equals [(σ 1 -1)β k ]+1, where β k is the absolute value of the Hong Kong indicator coefficient in Table 7 for each industry k. Column (4) equals 1/(σ 0 -1), and column (5) equals column (4) times column (1). Column (6) equals 1/2σ 0 , and column (7) equals column (6) times column (1).
In column (1) of Tables 8 and 9 , we show average Hong Kong markups on goods re-exported from China. These markups measure the inverse of the elasticity of demand for the provincial demand curves dd j in Figure 2: 18 18 In section 2 we treated σ 1 as the elasticity of the provincial demand curves dd j , whereas 1+α/(1-ρ 1 ) measures the elasticity of substitution of these curves. Provided that the share of each province in total re-exports through Hong Kong is small, however, then these are approximately equal.
where p 1kt is the Hong Kong price for good k in year t, and c 1kt is the marginal cost to the Hong Kong trader of obtaining that good from China. In Table 8 we allow the markups and elasticity to vary across years, and in Table 9 we allow them to vary across industries. Using these average markups, we readily calculate the lower-level elasticity σ 1 reported in column (2) of Tables 8 and 9. In the annual data these lie between 3.8 and 4.5, but can be considerably higher in specific industries, reflecting the very low markups in some sectors. Making use of the estimated coefficient of the Hong Kong inclusive value from the second-stage regression, we obtain σ 0 reported in column (3). This is lower than σ 1 and lies between 1.8 and 2.0 in the annual data from Table 8 , but considerably higher in some industries from Table 9 . Making use of these upper-level elasticity, we compute the welfare gains due to Hong Kong intermediaries in columns (4) and (5), using (19) for the CES specification, and in columns (6) and (7), using (20) for the linear approximation to the CES demand curve.
In Table 8 , the welfare gains in the CES specification are roughly equal to the value of re-exports from Hong Kong. These gains are nearly five times greater than the markups earned in Hong Kong. However, with the linear approximation the gains are about one-quarter as much as the value of Hong Kong re-exports, and slightly greater than the markups earned. In Table 9 the same average level of gains are obtained, but there is considerable variation across industries. In many industries the CES welfare gain is one-half as much as the Hong Kong re-exports, though in machinery and transport equipment it is twice as much as the re-exports. These results reflect the higher markups in machinery and transport, and lower implied elasticities σ 0 and σ 1 . When the CES welfare gain is computed relative to the value of markups, there is even more variation across industries. Using the linear approximation, the welfare gain ranges from 9% to 35% of the re-export value, or between 88% and 221% of the value of markups. Unfortunately, in the large category of miscellaneous manufactured articles (which includes apparel, footwear and toys) we did not obtain a coefficient on the Hong Kong price of the correct sign, so we cannot make the welfare calculation in that sector.
Are these welfare gains that we have obtained "too high"? The finding that the gains are nearly five times higher on average than the markups in Hong Kong (with CES demand) reflects both competition between intermediaries, keeping their markups low, and high willingness-to-pay for the services of these traders from firms abroad. There is no doubt, especially in the earlier years of our sample, that many foreign firms were poorly informed about the Chinese market and could not function there without the services provided by Hong Kong. Their willingness-to-pay compared with the alternative of contracting with China directly was surely high, as would be their welfare gain from having the Hong Kong traders available. But we should also recognize that they might contract with countries other than China: this is the upper-most decision in Figure 1 , which we have not modeled due to the lack of comparable data on outsourcing across countries. Having such alternative options available would lower the surplus obtained from Hong Kong traders (as well as lower the markups). Our use of the linear approximation to demand, as a lower-bound to any convex demand curve, is meant in part to allow for these alternative possibilities. With that lower-bound, the welfare gains from Hong Kong traders are still at least as large as the markups earned in most industries.
Conclusions
Recent theoretical work in international trade emphasizes the importance of traders: agents who are able to match clients across different countries. Among the largest traders in the world economy are those located in Hong Kong, who intermediate a huge volume of trade for China and other Asian countries. This intermediation surely brings significant gains to their clients, and in this paper we estimate the welfare gains to countries that use Hong Kong to outsource to China.
We recognize that there are a range of possible suppliers in China, which differ according to their quality and complementarity with the purchasing firm. Previous work (e.g. Grossman and Helpman, 2002a,b; Rauch and Trindade, 2003) models this sort of decision using an "idea varieties" approach in which there is product differentiation around a circle. We instead exploit two other equivalent approaches to modeling product differentiation: (i) obtaining "random utility" from various product varieties, and (ii) using a representative agent who purchases all varieties (Anderson, de Palma and Thisse, 1992) . We have modeled the first approach as applied to a purchasing firm, where the random errors measure transaction costs that differ across suppliers. We have then aggregated over input sourcing decisions by firms in a given country, to obtain a representative firm that chooses over two organizational modes: whether to purchase inputs from China directly or use an intermediary in Hong Kong.
Using this framework to obtain CES demand, we estimate that the average welfare gains to purchasing countries are 109% of the Hong Kong re-export value of processing goods, and range between 21% and 234% of the re-export value for specific industries. Alternatively, using a linear approximation as a lower-bound to any convex demand curve, the gains are 26% of the Hong Kong re-export value, and range between 9% and 35% across industries. About one-third of these gains accrue to firms in North America, and another one-quarter to firms in Western Europe. These represent efficiency gains to the firms involved in outsourcing, due to savings in transaction costs that would arise otherwise from dealing directly with firms in China. We can expect that these gains are then passed onto consumers worldwide in lower prices for goods outsourced through Hong Kong. These informational gains are in addition to the conventional gains from trade due to comparative advantage, and offer an empirical confirmation of the importance of intermediary traders, as considered in recent theoretical work.
agents can be aggregated to obtain market-level demand quite easily. The most common application of McFadden's theorem is to a consumer setting in which the good in question is purchased in quantity 0 or 1. In that case, if the random errors in utility are distributed as iid extreme value, then the solution for demand is the familiar logit formulation. If instead the random errors in utility were distributed as extreme value but correlated within some groups, then the solution for demand is the nested logit form.
Our formulation of the firm's problem of maximizing production given costs is analogous to the consumer problem of maximizing utility given income. It is more general than the typical discrete choice problem in that we are also allowing the firm to make a continuous choice of the inputs purchased in China. This falls into the category of so-called "continuous/discrete" models (Train, 1986) . Our formulation of the problem is simplified, however, because there is no uncertainty over the quantity of purchases in (A2): the random term in production affects only the choice of supplier in (A1). 20 It turns out that in this setting, the aggregation results of McFadden (1978 McFadden ( , 1981 still apply, as we now describe.
Suppose that the random term in (3) is distributed as extreme value but correlated within and across the modes of outsourcing. The distribution function for these errors is, 
where ρ i measures the correlation between random terms ε ijm within each mode of outsourcing i=1,2, while ρ 0 measures the correlation of errors across modes, and 0 < ρ 0 < ρ i < 1.
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With the error structure in (A4), let Y m ≡ exp[E(ln y m )] denote the expected value of production for a firm in country m that has spent C m on outsourcing. Then from the GEV theorem of McFadden, it can be shown that expected production (up to a constant) takes on the nested CES form: 22 20 In contrast, Dubin and McFadden (1984) consider an application where there is uncertainty in both the discrete choice of the product and the continuous amount to consume.
This distribution function is used by McFadden (1978 McFadden ( , 1981 to obtain the nested logit formulation. Johnson and Kotz (1972) report that with ρ 0 =0, the parameters (1-ρ i ) equal ) ikm , ijm ( corr 1 ε ε − , for j,k ∈ J im and j ≠ k. 22 A proof of this is provided in Anderson, de Palma and Thisse (1989, 1992) , and more directly in Feenstra (2004, Appendix B) , based on the GEV theorem of McFadden. 
This formulation can be thought of as an "indirect production function" of the firm, giving expected production Y m conditional on costs C m and input prices. Inverting (A5), we obtain the CES cost function for the representative firm in country m outsourcing to China, as in (4). Thus, by aggregating over the decisions of individual firms, we obtain a CES production or cost function to describe the demand for outsourcing services from each country m.
The CES functional form follows from the "continuous/discrete" setup of our model, whereby firms can purchase continuous amounts of outsourcing but from just one supplier. If this feature were not present, then the functional form given the error structure in (A4) would instead be nested logit.
